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 Considering Standing, Sincerity, and Antidiscrimination 
Chapin Cimino Cody ∗
Though it was not always so, the phrase “antidiscrimination” today 
refers equally to cases challenging affirmative action as to cases 
challenging “traditional” discrimination. We refer to cases challenging 
affirmative action as “reverse discrimination” cases, but they are 
antidiscrimination cases just the same.1 As such, the body of law that we 
call “antidiscrimination law” is developing and growing rapidly. One of 
these developments is that recently some federal courts have implicitly 
recognized that in a certain class of antidiscrimination cases, the 
“sincerity” with which the plaintiff brings the claim can affect the court’s 
determination of standing to sue. 
In this Article, I dub this developing principle “the norm of 
sincerity” and assert that the norm helps courts evaluate whether a 
plaintiff’s claimed constitutional injury is sufficiently concrete and 
personal to invoke federal jurisdiction. Further, in this Article, I assert 
that because the norm of sincerity helps courts evaluate injury in fact, 
courts should recognize the norm of sincerity and give it a rightful place 
in the developing antidiscrimination jurisprudence. 
At the outset, let me define terms. In all discrimination cases, a 
plaintiff complains that the government unconstitutionally denied her the 
ability to access a process or to compete for a benefit on the basis of race 
or national origin. In some of these cases, the alleged discrimination cuts 
off the plaintiff’s access to benefits that are finite, or limited, in number. 
For instance, two common examples of limited-resources cases include 
cases challenging racial or ethnic preferences in municipal contracting 
and cases challenging racial or ethnic preferences in university 
 ∗ J.D. with Honors, the University of Chicago Law School, 1997. The author will serve as 
an Associate Professor of Law at Drexel University College of Law beginning in June 2006. The 
author would like to thank Villanova Law School for its support while writing this article. The 
author also thanks Greg Magarian, Penelope Pether, and Louis Sirico, who provided invaluable 
comments on an earlier draft; Michael Carroll and the Villanova Law Faculty “brown baggers,” who 
offered help with the formation of these ideas; and Sarah Stevenson, Villanova Law Class of ‘07, 
who provided invaluable research assistance from start to finish. 
 1. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 234 (1995) (discrediting the notion 
of a “benign” racial classification and holding that all government racial classification “must serve a 
compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest”).  
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admissions. In the municipal contracting context, there are typically a 
finite number of contracts to be awarded; in university admissions, there 
are a finite number of seats in a class. Because there are only a finite 
number of benefits to be awarded in these cases, I think of them as 
“limited-resources” cases, and will refer to them that way. 
Another definition: by “sincerity” I mean that why a particular 
plaintiff is the one to bring an antidiscrimination claim matters to the 
injury-in-fact piece of the standing analysis. As will be shown infra, to 
state injury in fact in this class of discrimination cases, a plaintiff must 
show that she was, essentially, prepared to compete for the benefit at 
stake. A plaintiff meets this standard by offering objective evidence that 
she was “able and ready” to compete for the benefit.2 If the court 
suspects that the plaintiff has not met this showing, some courts have 
required that the plaintiff offer additional evidence. In my observation, 
what these courts are looking for in this more searching review is 
evidence that the plaintiff subjectively intended either to compete for or 
to use the benefits at stake. In other words, if and when a court suspects 
that the plaintiff was not, in fact, prepared to compete, the court then 
questions whether the plaintiff sincerely intended to compete at all. If she 
cannot demonstrate that she sincerely intended to compete, then she 
lacks injury in fact. If she lacks injury in fact, then she lacks standing to 
sue for the alleged discrimination. 
Thus, in this Article, I will show that the norm of sincerity is an 
implicit norm that helps courts evaluate injury in fact in limited-
resources discrimination cases. In other words, I will show that, for 
standing in this class of cases, a plaintiff may not merely aver that she 
has been discriminated against by a certain preference in a competitive 
process. Rather, she must be able to show the court, in some relevant and 
meaningful way, that she was in fact prepared to compete, which is in 
some cases an objective proxy for her subjective intent to compete. As I 
will demonstrate infra, the norm of sincerity is most observable when a 
transparent process governs the competition for the limited resources at 
stake. 
In this Article, I will also show that the norm of sincerity is highly 
relevant today. Both politically and legally, we have grappled for years 
with the question of what is an appropriate use of racial and/or ethnic 
 2. As shown infra Part I, the phrase “able and ready” comes from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General Contractors of America v. City of 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 657 (1993). 
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preferences in government programs. There is no reason to expect that 
litigation over this issue will end anytime soon. In fact, in my view, one 
important context where we should expect an increase in such litigation 
in the near future is in the realm of higher education, where the potential 
for reverse discrimination cases abounds. 
Specifically, affirmative action preferences are currently at work on 
college and university campuses across the country. The most obvious 
place is in the admissions office, but outside of that context, colleges and 
universities are also operating a plethora of affirmative action 
preferences across their campuses to support the institution’s “expressed 
commitment to the educational benefits of diversity.”3 These programs 
include minority-only or minority-preferred summer orientation and 
academic preparation programs, scholarships, fellowships, internships, 
and mentoring programs. Any one of these programs is theoretically a 
basis for a limited-resources discrimination claim. Through these 
preferences, universities award certain benefits to some students on the 
basis of race or national origin, but not to others. And when making these 
awards, universities are ultimately drawing from a finite pool of 
resources: the university budget.  
No plaintiff has yet tested the validity of any one of these preference 
programs through litigation on the merits,4 but those tests are surely 
coming. Writing in dissent in the 2003 Supreme Court decision in 
Grutter v. Bollinger, which confirmed that diversity in education is a 
compelling state interest,5 Justice Scalia predicted that one result of the 
Court’s holding would be a flood of litigation.6 He observed: 
Still other suits may challenge the bona fides of the institution’s 
expressed commitments to the educational benefits of diversity that 
immunize the discriminatory scheme in Grutter. (Tempting targets, one 
would suppose, will be those universities that talk the talk of 
multiculturalism and racial diversity in the courts but walk the walk of 
tribalism and racial segregation on their campuses—through minority-
 3. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 4. A Clemson University student filed one such suit against the National Science 
Foundation challenging “an NSF research fellowship for minority graduate students,” but the parties 
settled the suit out of court based on the NSF’s conclusion that the program was unlawful. Peter B. 
Schmidt, NIH Opening Minority Programs to Other Groups, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 11, 2005, 
at A26. 
 5. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (“[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s view that student body 
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.”). 
 6. Id. at 348–49 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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only student organizations, separate minority student centers, even 
separate minority-only graduation ceremonies.)7
One looking for such targets need not look far: currently these programs 
are operating across campuses nationwide.8
When these cases arrive at the courthouse, one important question 
that the universities are likely to raise is whether the particular student 
bringing the case has standing to assert the claim. Because these will be 
what I will refer to as limited-resources discrimination cases, the norm of 
sincerity will apply in this context. No commentator has recognized this 
developing trend. 
In Part I of this Article, I provide a brief overview of standing 
generally, and of standing in antidiscrimination cases specifically. In Part 
II, I contend that the injury-in-fact analysis in this class of cases contains 
an implicit norm: the norm of sincerity.9 In Part III, I establish that there 
is a trend developing here. Specifically, I will show that several federal 
courts have implicitly invoked sincerity to help answer the question of 
whether a particular antidiscrimination plaintiff demonstrated a 
sufficiently personal stake in the litigation to state injury in fact. In this 
Part, I will also show that a court’s sincerity judgment is most observable 
when a transparent process governs the competition for those benefits 
because a transparent process sets analytical markers by which courts can 
measure the plaintiff’s preparation to compete. Part IV considers how the 
norm would function in antidiscrimination cases in the higher education 
context, particularly in the context presaged by Justice Scalia. I conclude 
that the norm will be relevant in this context but could be difficult to 
 7. Id.  
 8. See generally Peter B. Schmidt, Not Just for Minority Students Anymore, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 19, 2004, at A17 (including a table of changes made to programs previously 
reserved for minorities and including a list of programs that have been officially challenged by OCR 
and which are still in dispute). 
 9. At least two other commentators have used the phrase “norm of sincerity.” One is Seanna 
Valentine Shiffrin, who posits a theory against compelled speech that relies in part on the “moral 
norm[] of sincerity” as a norm that is incompatible with the notion that persons may be “force[d] . . . 
to attest to things they do not believe.” Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with 
Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 860–64 (2005). The other is Meir Dan-Cohen, who 
argues that sincerity is directly correlated to one’s connection to or detachment from the role he or 
she is playing; i.e., that sincerity is a function of “role proximity.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves 
and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1220–25 (1994); 
see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Law, Community and Communication, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1654, 1668 & 
n.15 (arguing an attorney litigating on behalf of his client is “exempt from the norm of sincerity 
altogether”); Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory and Its 
Audience, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 569, 579–80, 581 n.27 (1992). 
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apply explicitly. Therefore, I conclude the Article by identifying and 
proposing a workable model for applying the able-and-ready standard, 
and its inherent norm of sincerity, to these and similar challenges. 
I. THE ABLE-AND-READY TEST FOR INJURY IN FACT IN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION CASES 
A. Standing Generally 
Volumes have been written on standing in equal protection cases, 
and my purpose is not to try to duplicate any of those efforts.10 Rather, 
my thesis is that something new is happening in a certain class of equal 
protection challenges: in limited-resources discrimination cases, some 
courts have implicitly recognized that sincerity matters to standing. To 
give context to this thesis, I ask the reader to retrace only a few of the 
steps of hornbook standing principles—steps necessary to understand the 
trend I see developing here. 
The doctrine of standing draws on principles from two sources: first, 
Article III of the Constitution, and second, “prudential” principles 
articulated in the decisional law.11 The focus of this Article is on the 
requirement of “injury in fact,” a constitutional necessity traced to 
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement.12 The focus here is on 
injury in fact because when the plaintiff claims that she was directly 
affected by the challenged program, rather than by the government’s 
regulation (or lack thereof) of the institution, causation and redressability 
should flow from the fact of the injury.13
 10. For the briefest sampling of some of these writings, one could consult Ashutosh 
Bhagwat, Injury Without Harm: Texas v. Lesage and the Strange World of Article III Injuries, 28 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 445 (2001); David Dow, The Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative 
Redistricting Cases – Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs, 81 MINN. L. REV. 
1123 (1997); or The Supreme Court, 1992 Term—Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 303 
(1993).  
 11. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 56–60 (4th ed. 2003).  
 12. See, e.g., David Flicklinger, Standing in Racial Gerrymandering Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
381, 384 (1997) (“The ‘irreducible minimum’ of Article III requires a showing that the plaintiff 
‘personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury.’” (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982))). The “case or 
controversy” requirement of Article III has been interpreted to require a showing of three distinct 
elements: injury, causation, and redressability. See id. (citing Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). 
 13. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62. The Court in Northeastern Florida also made this point. 
508 U.S. at 666 n.5. 
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Resolving standing questions is rarely easy,14 and standing in equal 
protection cases is no exception. Commentators have noted that holdings 
on standing in equal protection cases are erratic at best, and at worst, 
discriminatory against powerless plaintiffs.15 Yet standing is especially 
important in constitutional cases because courts should refrain from 
deciding constitutional questions unless absolutely necessary to resolve 
the specific dispute at issue,16 and courts should not decide constitutional 
questions without an adequate factual background to ensure that the 
principle enunciated in the decision will not be improperly extended.17
The three constitutionally grounded requirements of standing are 
familiar.18 First, a plaintiff must show that she has been “injured in fact,” 
meaning that she has experienced “an invasion of a legally protected 
interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual and 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”;19 second, the plaintiff must 
show “a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged 
conduct”;20 and third, the plaintiff must show “a likelihood that the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision,” meaning “that the 
‘prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable 
ruling’ is not ‘too speculative.’”21 The burden of proving standing is on 
the party asserting jurisdiction.22
 14. See, e.g., Flicklinger, supra note 12, at 383 & n.14 (“Members of the Supreme Court and 
its observers have complained that standing doctrine is one of the most confusing areas of the law.” 
(citing Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, at 54)); see also Girardeau A. 
Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1422, 1426 (1995) (“The law of standing is in a 
state of notorious disarray.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Spann, supra note 14, at 1423 (“[C]lose examination suggests that the Supreme 
Court’s standing decisions embody the very sort of racial discrimination that we rely on the Court to 
prevent.”). 
 16. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974) (noting 
the importance of the injury requirement in constitutional litigation to avoid unnecessary 
adjudication and observing that “concrete injury removes from the realm of speculation whether 
there is a real need to exercise the power of judicial review in order to protect the interests of the 
complaining party”); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can 
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1310 & n.132 (2005) 
(citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS (1962)). 
 17. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1310–11 & n.133 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme 
Court, 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996)). 
 18. Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 663–64. 
 19. Id. at 663 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 20. Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
 21. Id. at 663–64 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984)). 
 22. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
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B. Northeastern Florida and the “Able and Ready To Compete” Test 
Though the trilogy of injury in fact, causation, and redressability are 
by now hornbook requirements of standing law, the precise meaning of 
each of these requirements remains somewhat elusive. Most relevant to 
this Article is the precise meaning of the injury-in-fact requirement. 
Specifically, the meaning of the injury-in-fact requirement was the 
subject of the 1993 Supreme Court decision in Northeastern Florida 
Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of 
Jacksonville.23 There, the Court held that in discrimination cases, a 
plaintiff states injury in fact when she pleads or offers evidence that she 
was able and ready to compete for the benefits she claims she was 
impermissibly denied and would have competed but for the alleged 
unlawful discrimination.24
In Northeastern Florida, the Supreme Court held that to argue injury 
in fact in an equal protection challenge to a city construction ordinance 
preferring minority contractors, a plaintiff need not allege that he would 
have obtained the contract but for discrimination on the basis of race.25 
Rather, the Court held that the plaintiff must aver only that he would 
have competed for the contract in the absence of the challenged racial 
discrimination.26 In short, the decision in Northeastern Florida means 
that to show injury in fact in an equal protection discrimination suit, a 
plaintiff must state that he was, at the time the suit was filed, able and 
ready to compete for that benefit.27
Specifically, in Northeastern Florida, the plaintiff, the Association 
of General Contractors (AGC), sued the City of Jacksonville seeking to 
enjoin the city from setting aside ten percent of its city construction 
contracts for minority business enterprises.28 The district court found for 
the plaintiff and entered a temporary restraining order.29 On appeal, the 
 23. 508 U.S. 656. 
 24. Id. at 657. 
 25. Id. at 666. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. Note that the standard works both for claims for compensatory damages, in which 
case the question is whether the plaintiff was, at the time he was excluded from the competition, able 
and ready to compete, and also for claims for prospective relief, in which case the question is 
whether the plaintiff will, in the very near future, be unable to compete for a benefit. See id. at 668 
(noting allegations that AGC members “regularly bid” in the past on contracts and allegations that 
they “would have bid” in the future on other contracts but for the challenged ordinance). 
 28. Id. at 658. 
 29. Id. at 659. 
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Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing 
because “it ‘has not demonstrated that, but for the program, any AGC 
member would have bid successfully for any of these contracts.’”30 The 
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit.31 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Thomas reasoned that past equal protection cases illustrated that a 
plaintiff need not show he would have been awarded a contract but for 
the challenged ordinance.32 This was true because the Court found that 
the constitutional injury in an equal protection case is not the ultimate 
loss of the benefit at stake, but rather is the denial of (or barrier to) a 
person’s ability “to compete on an equal footing” for that benefit.33
Commentators offer mixed reviews on the result in Northeastern 
Florida34 and disagree over whether the decision represented a change in 
the law.35 Whether it does is irrelevant here; what is relevant is whether 
 30. Id. at 660 (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of 
Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1218 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
 31. The precise issue for the Supreme Court in Northeastern Florida was, on a claim for 
prospective relief, “whether, in order to have standing to challenge the ordinance, an association of 
contractors is required to show that one of its members would have received a contract absent the 
ordinance.” Id. at 658. The Court held that the contractors were not required to make that showing. 
Id.; cf. Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18 (1999). In Lesage, where the plaintiff, a white applicant 
rejected from a university Ph.D. program, did not allege an ongoing violation and did not seek 
injunction. The university consequently defended at the jurisdictional stage by stating that it would 
have made the same decision in absence of any discriminatory preference. Rather, when only 
damages are sought, the government can avoid liability by showing that they would have made the 
same decision but for the impermissible factor. Id. at 20–21. 
 32. Northeastern Florida, 508 U.S. at 664. 
 33. Id. at 666. 
 34. For example, one commentator has dubbed this the “affirmative action exception to the 
injury requirement” of standing doctrine. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The 
Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 326 (2002). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Standing 
Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 37, 43–44 (1993) (finding the result in Northeastern Florida correct 
and asking “what sense would it make to require the plaintiffs to prove that they would actually have 
been awarded the relevant contracts? How would constitutional goals be served by such an odd 
requirement?”). Notably, while Professor Sunstein thinks that the Court got the result right in 
Northeastern Florida, he asserts that the case “exposes . . . a fundamental problem in the modern 
law of standing—the assumption . . . that ‘injuries’ can be identified without reference to positive 
law.” Id. at 63. 
 35. Despite the Court’s reliance on precedent in Northeastern Florida, some have observed 
that the holding represented a new development in equal protection standing doctrine. See, e.g., 
Nichol, supra note 34, at 326; see also Spann, supra note 15 passim. Moreover, a review of opinions 
in cases in the affirmative action/reverse discrimination context prior to Northeastern Florida show 
that it was not obvious that a plaintiff could demonstrate injury in fact merely by demonstrating that 
he was prepared to compete for the benefit. By contrast, prior to the decision in Northeastern 
Florida, at least some federal appellate courts had presumed that the plaintiff needed to show that he 
at least had a chance of winning the ultimate competition. For example, in the context of challenge 
to racial preference in university admissions, a plaintiff had to show that he had some chance of 
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the able-and-ready standard fits the purposes to which it is put. Does the 
standard, which explicitly tests a plaintiff’s preparation to compete, help 
courts identify injury in fact in antidiscrimination cases? In the next part 
of this Article, I conclude that it does, but a key reason it does is that 
there is more to the able-and-ready test than meets the eye. Specifically, 
the test contains an inherent norm, which is the norm of sincerity. 
II. THE ABLE-AND-READY STANDARD’S INHERENT “NORM OF 
SINCERITY” 
I have already said that the able-and-ready test is intended to help 
courts evaluate whether, at the time a plaintiff was excluded from a 
competition for government benefits due to race or national origin, that 
plaintiff was prepared to compete for that benefit.36 In this Part, I will 
show that while courts explicitly use the able-and-ready standard to 
analyze a plaintiff’s preparation to compete, some courts, under the able-
and-ready rubric, also seem to implicitly evaluate whether the plaintiff 
sincerely intended to compete. In other words, I will show here that a 
plaintiff’s subjective sincerity with respect to her intent to compete can 
be as important to the standing analysis as is her objective preparation for 
the competition. To do this, I will show how the able-and-ready test and 
its inherent norm of sincerity operate through a paradigm fact pattern, 
that of a recent and notable equal protection case. 
A. The Norm of Sincerity: A Paradigm Case 
In an equal protection case where injury in fact is an issue, a pattern 
emerges in recent opinions. First, a plaintiff avers that at the time the suit 
was filed, she intended or wanted to compete for a benefit but that, due to 
allegedly unlawful racial or ethnic discrimination, she was prevented 
from doing so. When the plaintiff makes this averment, and if either the 
ultimately winning the competition but for the exclusion—i.e., the plaintiff must have been at least 
admissible under the school’s objective admissions criteria. If he did not meet the school’s objective 
admissions criteria, then he could not have been injured in fact by any preference, discriminatory or 
not, that resulted in his being excluded from the competition for the benefit. See Dougherty v. 
Rutgers Sch. of Law-Newark, 651 F.2d 893, 902 (3d Cir. 1981) (disagreeing with plaintiff’s claim 
that he was injured in fact simply by the defendant’s preferential admissions program, 
notwithstanding the evidence that he did not meet the school’s objective admissions requirements, 
and finding no injury in fact where the plaintiff failed to show that “there was a chance of successful 
admission had s/he not been prohibited from competing for all the seats.” (emphasis added) 
(interpreting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 280 n.14 (1978))). That thinking 
changed with the decision in Northeastern Florida. 
 36. See supra Part I. 
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defendant or the court raises the issue of standing, the court will look to 
the record to determine whether the plaintiff has shown that she is 
adequately prepared for the competition. Doctrinally, this examination is 
the able-and-ready analysis. A plaintiff can show preparation if she can 
demonstrate that she took some necessary step toward the competition. 
In the trend of developing cases, if she has taken such a step, that step is 
regarded explicitly as sufficient evidence of preparation. Yet, if she 
cannot show that she has taken such a step, in this class of cases, the 
court will require additional evidence of the plaintiff’s intent. Explicitly, 
the court is seeking objective “bona fides”37 to back up the plaintiff’s 
professed, but inherently subjective, intent. Implicitly, the court is asking 
the plaintiff to demonstrate the sincerity of her stated intent to compete. 
Consider a single paradigm case, Carroll v. Nakatani.38 In Nakatani, 
the plaintiff, a non-native Hawaiian, claimed that Article XII of the 
Hawaii State Constitution, which created the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 
(“OHA”), violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as it restricted the provision of certain benefits to native 
Hawaiians, including preferential terms for small business start-up 
loans.39 The plaintiff had initially filed an application with OHA for 
such a loan, but the state returned the application to him. Because the 
state required the applicant to note native Hawaiian ancestry, which the 
applicant here could not and did not do, the state considered the 
application incomplete.40 The plaintiff did not complete and resubmit the 
application because he alleged that it would be “futile.”41
Because the plaintiff never filed a “completed” application, the 
defendant argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the 
program.42 The district court ultimately found that the plaintiff did lack 
standing, but not for this reason.43 Notably, the reason that the defense 
offered as evidence that the plaintiff failed to state injury in fact—that 
the plaintiff failed to complete the application—in effect raised the 
court’s suspicions: to the court, the incomplete application was an 
analytical marker that suggested insincerity. 
 37. Carroll v. Nakatani, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1227 (D. Haw. 2001), aff’d, 342 F.3d 934 (9th 
Cir. 2003). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1221–22. 
 40. Id. at 1224–25. 
 41. Id. at 1225–26. 
 42. Id. at 1226–29. 
 43. Id. at 1225–26. 
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Specifically, the district court closely examined the plaintiff’s 
averment that he would use the loan to open a copy shop, and the court 
concluded that the plaintiff really had no interest in doing so.44 The 
district court found that the plaintiff’s lack of relevant background or 
experience was fatal to his claim of injury in fact: 
[The plaintiff] has shown no real initiative in starting a new business—
he has not sought alternate sources of financing (as is required by 
OHA, even for Hawaiians), he has not formulated even the most basic 
of business plans, and could offer no real details about his proposed 
business, among other things. In short, he has offered no bona fides 
(other than his cursory statement that he wants to start up a business) 
that he actually intends to start a copy shop.45
The district court noted further that the plaintiff had failed to research the 
market for copy shops beyond “casually speak[ing] to a sales clerk at 
Office Depot”; that he lacked any information as to the cost of business, 
including rent, equipment, and paper; that he had not pursued any 
alternative financing programs; and that he had no business plan.46
Doctrinally, the court considered these facts in the context of the 
able-and-ready analysis.47 Underpinning this explicit analysis is an 
implicit evaluation of whether the plaintiff sincerely intended, in fact, to 
use the benefits at stake. The court concluded, based on the evidence of 
what the plaintiff had not done, that the plaintiff lacked “real present and 
immediate intention of opening a business.”48 Absent such a “real 
present and immediate intention,”49 the court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s asserted injury was nothing more than “philosophical,”50 that 
the plaintiff lacked the required personal stake in the case,51 and that his 
complaint presented a nonjusticiable “generalized grievance.”52
 44. Id. at 1227. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1227 n.10. 
 47. Id. at 1228–29 (analyzing whether the plaintiff was able and ready to compete for a small 
business loan in the preferential program administered by OHA). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1226. 
 51. Id. at 1228–29. 
 52. Id. at 1228. 
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld both the district court’s finding 
and analysis.53 The Ninth Circuit considered and rejected the plaintiff’s 
proffered evidence of injury in fact.54 The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
plaintiff’s intent is relevant in an equal protection case and reviewed the 
plaintiff’s evidence.55 It found that the plaintiff could not show that the 
government had treated him unequally because of the OHA preference.56 
Instead, the court reasoned that he failed to show that he was able and 
ready to compete for or benefit from an OHA loan.57 The court wrote 
that even assuming proper intent, the plaintiff’s failure to complete an 
application showed that he was not in a position to “compete equally” 
with other applicants for a loan should he be permitted to do so.58 The 
court concluded that instead of an injury in fact, the plaintiff had averred 
merely a generalized grievance, and, accordingly, the plaintiff lacked 
standing to challenge the OHA program.59
Thus, the Nakatani opinions illustrate what is a developing trend60 in 
opinions of this class of cases: when an equal protection discrimination 
plaintiff avers he is able and ready to compete for the benefit at stake, but 
has not taken concrete steps to prepare to compete, that omission should 
cause the court to doubt the plaintiff’s sincerity. The court’s doubt is 
shown by the court’s searching examination for some other pleading (if 
on a motion to dismiss) or evidence (if on a motion for summary 
judgment) of intent: something that shows that the plaintiff actually and 
sincerely intended (or intends in the future) to use the benefits at stake. If 
the court finds nothing, standing is denied because the plaintiff lacks an 
injury in fact. In sum, this pattern reveals the norm of sincerity at work in 
this class of cases. 
Before moving on to analyze more of those cases, however, it is 
worthwhile to note a counterexample to my thesis. The counter-example 
shows that sincerity is only one factor of the injury in fact analysis in this 
 53. Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s opinion that 
plaintiffs lacked standing). 
 54. Id. at 941–43. On appeal the plaintiff offered three theories of injury in fact: first, that the 
fact of the racial classification itself was sufficient injury; second, that preferred classes were 
afforded “greater sovereignty” in the state; and third, that he suffered “representational harm” similar 
to the harm alleged in redistricting cases. Id. at 941. 
 55. Id. at 942 (citing Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 261 (2003)). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 943 (citing United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 743–44 (1995)). 
 60. More of these cases are considered infra in Part III. 
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line of cases: a finding of sincerity does not necessarily mean that the 
plaintiff has established the required personal stake in the litigation.  
B. The Limits of Sincerity: Some Counter-Examples 
Note that while the Nakatani opinions illustrate this emerging 
pattern, sincerity is not the only factor relevant to personal stake or to 
injury in fact. Sincerity is only one factor. It is true that a plaintiff can be 
“sincere” yet lack the required personal stake in the outcome of the 
litigation that is necessary to demonstrate injury in fact.  
Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have for years recognized 
that a plaintiff may be unquestionably sincere yet lack standing. For 
example, in the well-known case of Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee 
to Stop the War, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring an action to compel the Secretary of Defense to enforce 
the Incompatibility Clause of the Constitution.61 Specifically, the 
plaintiffs had sought an order requiring the Secretary of Defense to 
refuse to allow any then-current member of the U.S. Congress to also 
serve as a member of the Federal Reserves, and requiring the Secretary 
to recover the pay that anyone who had served as a member of both 
groups at the same time had earned as a Reservist.62 Both the district 
court and the circuit court found that plaintiffs did have standing to seek 
this order, but the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the complaint 
did not assert a sufficiently concrete injury because the injury alleged 
was too abstract.63  
Notably, the district court had considered the fact that the parties 
“sharply conflicted in their interests and views” as partial support for its 
conclusion that the complaint presented a sufficiently concrete and 
adversarial dispute.64 In other words, the district court seemed to infer 
that the dispute was sufficiently concrete in part because the parties 
sincerely disagreed on the merits of the points pressed in the case. A 
majority of the Supreme Court rejected both the district court’s finding 
and its reasoning, and stated, 
We have no doubt about the sincerity of the respondents’ stated 
 61. 418 U.S. 208, 209–11 (1974).  
 62. Id. at 211. 
 63. Id. at 209, 220–21 (“Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable 
element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial 
resolution.”). 
 64. Id. at 225. 
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objectives and the depth of their commitment to them. But the essence 
of standing “is not a question of motivation but of possession of the 
requisite . . . interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the 
unconstitutional conduct.”65
Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ sincerity alone was 
insufficient to show the required personal stake in the case, and as such, 
insufficient by itself to invoke federal jurisdiction over the dispute. 
A more recent and particularly candid example of the limits of 
sincerity is the opinion in In re Marriage License of McKinley.66 The 
opinion in In re Marriage License illustrates quite nicely that a plaintiff’s 
philosophical objection to a state’s act is not the equivalent of a 
“personal stake” in the outcome of the litigation over the act, even when 
that plaintiff is undoubtedly sincere in his stated interest in the effect of 
the litigation’s outcome.  
In re Marriage License is a recent decision of the Judicial Appeals 
Tribunal of the Cherokee Nation.67 There, a third-party, Todd Hembree, 
challenged the validity of another couple’s marriage, which was a same-
sex marriage.68 In his complaint, Mr. Hembree argued that the marriage 
was “in total disregard to the Cherokee laws,” and that any citizen of the 
Cherokee nation suffered “direct harm” when “such a law is violated 
under the authority of the Cherokee Constitution.”69 The women whose 
marriage he challenged argued that Mr. Hembree lacked the requisite 
direct stake in the outcome of the resolution of the suit: “[W]hile Mr. 
Hembree may have a strong political or philosophical interest in 
 65. Id. at 225–26 (quoting Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 435 (1952)). 
 66. In the Matter of the Appeal of the Adverse Order of the District Court Against Kathy 
Reynolds and Dawn L. McKinley, Pro Se, No. JAT-04-15 (August 2, 2005) [hereinafter In re 
Marriage License] (order opinion of Chief Justice Darell R. Matlock, Justice Stacy L. Leeds, and 
Justice Darrell Dowty, and order granting the Reynolds/Smith Motion to Dismiss the Hembree 
complaint of standing grounds) (on file with author). 
 67. Id. The decision is relevant to this analysis because Cherokee law looks to federal law to 
resolve standing questions, though the parties disagreed as to the precise extent that it does so. 
Compare Reynolds/McKinley Motion to Dismiss at 8–9, In re Marriage License, No. JAT-04-15 
(July 8, 2005), available at http://www.nclrights.org/cases/pdf/reynoldsmotion.pdf, with Hembree’s 
Response to Motion to Dismiss at *2–3, In re Marriage License, No. JAT-04-15 (July 27, 2005) (on 
file with author) (acknowledging that as a matter of broad principle, Cherokee law looks to federal 
law to determine standing, but asserting that where federal procedural law would be unjust or cause 
delay, those principles may be disregarded) (citing Cherokee decisional law). 
 68. See Response to Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67. 
 69. Id. at *3–4. 
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obtaining a ruling that same-sex couples are excluded from marriage 
under Cherokee law, that interest is not sufficient to confer standing.”70
In a one-page order, the Judicial Appeals Tribunal of the Cherokee 
Nation agreed with the respondents that Todd Hembree lacked any 
personal stake in the matter because he did not show the marriage would 
harm him individually.71 His challenge was dismissed for a lack of 
standing because Mr. Hembree “failed to show that he will suffer 
individualized harm.”72 Notably for this purpose, no one doubted Mr. 
Hembree’s sincerity as to his beliefs, either expressly or implicitly, yet 
the sincerity of his beliefs regarding the outcome of the litigation was not 
sufficient to make up for the absence of a legally relevant personal stake 
in the litigation. 
Thus, it should be clear that I am not claiming that “sincerity” is the 
end of injury-in-fact analysis in this line of cases. I posit only that 
sincerity is a factor that implicitly informs the injury-in-fact analysis 
because it speaks to whether a particular plaintiff is subjectively, as well 
as objectively, “prepared” to compete for the benefits at stake. Even with 
this qualification, two questions could be raised regarding my thesis so 
far. First, how is the norm of sincerity different than the preexisting 
requirement that the plaintiff not lie in her pleadings? Second, is it not 
possible that a plaintiff could simply fake sincerity? 
There is a single answer to these related concerns, namely, that rather 
than creating another opportunity to press false points, the norm of 
sincerity instead helps courts identify falsity. As will be shown infra, an 
equal protection claim is not supposed to mask what is nothing other than 
a social or political dispute in the clothing of a personal, particularized 
legal dispute.73 The sincerity norm is called upon precisely to (and does) 
root out such falsity. While it is true that one who is prone to lie in a 
pleading can profess a false interest in a benefit that is not sincerely held, 
the function of the norm of sincerity is precisely to detect such lies. The 
norm is “triggered,” so to speak, when a plaintiff’s objective actions are 
inconsistent with her professed intent. 
 70. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 67, at 13. 
 71. In re Marriage License, supra note 66. 
 72. Id. Mr. Hembree has tried again, this time by adding the legislators who apparently wrote 
the marriage law to his action. See Teddye Snell, Councilors Join Cherokee Gay Marriage 
Controversy, TAHLEQUAH DAILY PRESS, Nov. 9, 2005 (reporting council member Linda Hughes 
O’Leary’s statement that “[it] was ruled that Todd [Hembree] had no standing in the case . . . . We 
are the legislators for the Cherokee Nation. We make the laws, and we do have standing.”) 
 73. See infra Part II.C. 
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Thus, the able-and-ready test possesses an inherent norm of sincerity. 
Under the able-and-ready rubric, courts explicitly analyze the plaintiff’s 
objective preparation to compete for the benefit at stake. Under that same 
rubric, some courts also implicitly test the plaintiff’s subjective sincerity 
with respect to her stated intent to compete. As such, subjective sincerity 
can be as important as objective preparation to the injury-in-fact analysis 
in this class of cases. 
C. A Doctrinal and Normative Analysis of the Able-and-Ready Standard 
and Its Inherent Norm of Sincerity 
I have already established that the able-and-ready test asks whether 
the particular plaintiff was, at the time she was excluded from competing 
for a government benefit due to her race or national origin, in fact 
prepared to compete for that benefit.74 If the plaintiff were able and 
ready to compete for the benefit, then being excluded from that 
competition would have injured her in the relevant way for standing 
purposes. By contrast, if she were not able and ready to compete, then 
being excluded from the competition would not have caused her injury in 
fact, and she would lack standing.75
The idea of the able-and-ready test is that a court will find injury 
where the plaintiff can show some relevant preparation for the 
competition. However, as the Nakatani opinions show, sometimes 
determining whether a plaintiff has prepared for the competition is, in 
fact, quite complicated—evaluating injury in the fact can be an 
especially tricky analysis in any antidiscrimination case. The reason is 
that equal protection litigation by its nature can be somewhat inherently 
political.76 This is so because discrimination litigation can be employed 
to press a political or social, as opposed to an exclusively legal, 
 74. The injury-in-fact piece of the standing analysis is based on the plaintiff herself and not 
on the issues: “In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court 
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 75. See Carroll v. Nakatani, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1228–29 (D. Haw. 2001) (noting that the 
plaintiff did not suffer “injury in fact” because he did not adequately show he was able and ready to 
compete for the business loan he was denied and that the plaintiff was without a “real present and 
immediate intention of opening a business”), aff’d, 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003). For a complete 
discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 37–59. 
 76. See, e.g., Dow, supra note 10, at 1134 (“Constitutional rights, including the equal 
protection right, are constraints on the political majority’s political power. They are thus, by 
definition, available only against the political majority.”). 
2CODY.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:45:53 PM 
71] Considering Standing, Sincerity, and Antidiscrimination 
 87 
 
agenda.77 Examples include equal protection litigation campaigns 
proposing law reform in the areas of school desegregation,78 affirmative 
action,79 anti-affirmative action,80 and gender and sexuality rights.81 
Given the broad political and social ramifications of these cases, it is not 
hard to imagine that the plaintiffs who brought these suits were 
motivated at least in part by the desire to vindicate political preferences, 
as well as to compensate for the denial of personal rights. 
Judges, however, are jurisdictional gatekeepers and as such, must 
ensure that a courtroom does not become a forum for academic debate on 
the merits of the political ideas underlying any particular case.82 Judges 
 77. Whether the law should assume this function is debated. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, 
Elites, Social Movements and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 
1436 (2005) (observing in the article’s first sentence that “Supreme Court opinions are forms of 
public discourse that both shape and reflect national debates about controversial subjects, including 
race”). 
 78. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
OVERCOMING LAW 63 (1995). 
Whatever its motive or juridical content, Brown was politically highly consequential—it 
thrust the Supreme Court into the midst of a power struggle between the southern and the 
nonsouthern states and in that respect could be thought a reprise of the Dred Scott 
decision. The Court’s reluctance to come to grips with what might have seemed the 
central issue—the intentions of southern legislators in imposing segregation—and its 
delay in ordering compliance with its ruling are other political aspects of the decision. 
(The determination to avoid seeming political may itself be politically motivated.) 
Id. 
 79. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see also Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, 
Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1691 (2005) (arguing that 
“constitutional principles are political compromises” and observing that “adopting certain 
constitutional principles, and not others, is sometimes a method of compromise; it is a way of 
explaining and justifying political compromise in what appears to be a principled fashion”). 
 80. See Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 633, 634–36 (2005) 
(questioning the institutional competence of the Court “to formulate racial policy for the nation” and 
observing that “it is hard to find in the phrase ‘equal protection’ any justification for Supreme Court 
invalidation of affirmative action burdens that the political majority has chosen to impose upon itself 
to ‘equalize’ the status of those racial minorities whom American culture has historically treated as 
inferior”). 
 81. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1315 (asserting that the decisions in both Roe v. Wade 
(gender rights) and Bowers v. Hardwick (sexuality rights) were “avoidable exercises in stakes-
raising politics”). 
 82. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (noting that the “actual injury” requirement implicitly embodied in Article 
III helps ensure that “the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified 
atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic 
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action”); see also Gettman v. Drug Enforcement 
Admin., 290 F.3d 430, 432–34 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek 
federal court review of agency’s dismissal of their petition to initiate rulemaking proceedings and 
noting that “[w]hile it is perfectly proper, and indeed appropriate and even necessary, for the 
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must ensure that courts remain a forum of last resort for adjudicating 
concrete, actual, particularized disputes between adversarial parties.83 As 
noted supra, a dispute is particularized if the plaintiff bringing the suit 
has been injured in a personal and direct way.84 Personal and direct 
injury is tested by the requirement of injury in fact,85 and, as explained 
above, injury in fact in the equal protection discrimination context is 
shown when a plaintiff is able and ready to compete.86
Now we have come full circle because, as Nakatani and other similar 
opinions87 show, the appearance of preparation can be illusive or 
deceiving, especially if the court suspects that a plaintiff’s motivation for 
bringing a discrimination case is on balance more political than personal. 
Judges have the responsibility to ensure that the plaintiff bringing the 
case has a personal right at stake.88 Especially when there is no such 
personal right to be vindicated, a judge may not let litigation substitute 
for the political process.89
political branches to respond to the abstract, ideological, philosophical or even idiosyncratic wishes 
and needs of citizens . . . the courts are granted authority only for the purpose delineated in Article 
III, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution and ‘may exercise power only in the last resort and as a 
necessity’” (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984))). 
 83. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 
454 U.S. at 472; Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (“[W]hen a plaintiff’s 
standing is brought into issue the relevant inquiry is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the 
plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Absent 
such a showing, exercise of its power by a federal court would be gratuitous and thus inconsistent 
with the Art. III limitation.”). 
 84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Lee v. State, 107 F.3d 1382, 1387 
(9th Cir. 1997) (“[S]tanding is primarily concerned with who is a proper party to litigate a particular 
matter.”) (citing CHEMERINSKY, supra note 11, § 2.4 at 98–99). 
 85. See Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 
508 U.S. 656, 663 (1993) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 86. Id. at 666; see supra notes 37–59 and accompanying text. 
 87. See infra notes 128–148 and accompanying text (discussing the Lac View and Pedersen 
cases). 
 88. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 766 (1984) (“The necessity that the plaintiff who seeks to invoke 
judicial power stand to profit in some personal interest remains an Art. III requirement.” (quoting 
Simon, 426 U.S. at 39 (1976)) (quotation marks omitted)); see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 
U.S. at 472 (1982) (“[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court’s 
authority to ‘show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the 
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.’” (quoting Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 
U.S. 91, 99 (1979))). 
 89. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 1310 (noting that courts have the power both to promote 
and to “undermine democracy . . . . Judicial review can raise the stakes of politics by taking issues 
away from the political system prematurely ” and noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has plenty of 
doctrinal tools that can keep it from fanning the flames of high-stakes identity politics issues. These 
include the ‘passive virtues,’ where the Court deploys procedural doctrines [such as standing] to 
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To be sure, I do not mean to suggest that a discrimination case is 
somehow improper simply because the case, in addition to presenting a 
specific and concrete legal dispute between adversaries, also carries 
broader social or political ramifications—far from it. Rather, the point 
here is that a discrimination case only implicates the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts if the plaintiff can show that she has standing to bring the 
claim. Specifically, as the norm of sincerity helps courts evaluate 
whether a plaintiff in an otherwise “political” equal protection case has 
in fact been injured in a legally relevant way, the norm of sincerity serves 
a valuable function. 
III. JUDGING SINCERITY 
I have suggested so far that sincerity is an implicit factor in the able-
and-ready analysis.90 I have also suggested that while it is implicit, the 
norm is especially important in a certain class of equal protection cases: 
cases in which a limited pool of resources is at stake. This part of the 
Article will address how the norm of sincerity works in these cases. 
Specifically, in this Part, I will first explain more fully a premise of 
my thesis that up to now, I have asked the reader to presume: why there 
is a difference in the patterns of limited versus unlimited resource 
cases.91 Then, I will show that the norm is most readily observable in a 
subclass of limited-resources cases: cases in which a transparent 
competitive process governs how the benefits at stake are distributed.92
A. Limited v. Unlimited Resources 
Sincerity is especially important when the ultimate benefit at stake in 
an equal-protection-based discrimination case is access to a pool of 
limited resources. The reason is that when resources are limited, 
someone will win and someone will lose the competition for the 
resources. When courts referee such a zero-sum game, they generally are 
more likely to be suspicious of intent than when the contest by its nature 
does not require losers. In other words, when the benefit at stake is 
avoid decisions that might settle controversial issues prematurely; a ‘minimalist’ approach to 
constitutional law . . . .”).  
 90. See, e.g., Carroll v. Nakatani, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1227 (D. Haw. 2001) (“Plaintiff 
Barrett cannot establish that he is ‘ready and able’ to benefit from an OHA business start-up loan. . . 
. In short, he has offered no bona fides (other than his cursory statement that he wants to start up a 
business) that he actually intends to start a copy shop.”), aff’d, 342 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 91. See infra Part IV.A. 
 92. See infra Part IV.B. 
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access to an otherwise generally available resource, such as access to a 
child support order modification process,93 courts are more likely to 
accept a plaintiff’s pleading of able and ready at face value. 
One example of the less-exacting sincerity analysis applied in cases 
of generally available resources is the decision in Williams v. Lambert.94 
There, the Second Circuit evaluated a state statutory scheme by which 
parents of legitimate children who wished to modify child support orders 
had access to one process, and parents of illegitimate children who 
wished to modify child support orders were subject to a more 
burdensome process.95 The mother of a child born out of wedlock 
argued that these burdens violated her equal protection rights.96 The 
father opposed her complaint and argued that she was not injured in fact, 
and so lacked standing to sue because the state provided a way for 
parents of children born out of wedlock to seek modification of support 
orders.97
While not using the terms “able and ready,” the Second Circuit 
applied the injury-in-fact analysis set forth in Northeastern Florida.98 
The court noted that the reasoning of Northeastern Florida “applies with 
the same force to Williams’s equal protection claim.”99 But rather than 
following the pattern of retracing the plaintiff’s steps to determine 
whether she had met certain markers of preparation to pursue the less 
burdensome modification process, the court simply noted that 
[t]he New York legislature has created a barrier which makes it more 
difficult for a parent of an illegitimate child to have a support 
agreement modified than it is for a parent of a child born in wedlock. 
Williams is injured by the denial of equal access to the modification 
process.100  
 93. See infra notes 94–104 and accompanying text. 
 94. 46 F.3d 1275 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 95. Id. at 1277–78 (describing dichotomous statutory processes). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1278. 
 98. Id. at 1279 (noting that “[d]etermining injury in fact is not always easy” and applying 
Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. City of 
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993)). 
 99. Id. at 1280. 
 100. Id. 
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The court reached this result even though it acknowledged that there 
was in fact a procedure open to Williams by which she could seek 
modification of the child support order, yet she had not pursued it.101
The plaintiff’s sincerity was never in question. The Second Circuit 
did not require that the plaintiff offer evidence, for example, that she 
tried to utilize but was denied access to the less burdensome rubric 
applicable to parents of children born in wedlock. Nor did the court 
require that she show entitlement to a modification of the support order. 
In fact, the court expressly stated that “[j]ust as the contractors [in 
Northeastern Florida] did not have to show that they would have 
obtained the contracts had they bid, Williams need not show that she 
could successfully modify the support agreement if she were given 
access to the modification procedure.”102
Notably, the court did not ask for validation of her intent to avail 
herself of that process as courts tend to do when the benefits at stake are 
limited resources.103 In contrast, the court seemed to presume sincerity, 
which is quite different than the more exacting analysis seen in the 
limited-resources cases.104 A reasonable explanation for this distinction 
could be that in Williams, the benefit at stake was limited qualitatively 
but not quantitatively. There was no cap on the number of parents who 
could seek to modify child support orders through the preferred statutory 
rubric; there was only a limit as to the type of parent who could use that 
rubric. In effect, the challenged rubric was not a zero-sum contest. These 
circumstances are quite different from those where there is a quantifiable 
limit on the available benefits. In this latter type of case, the norm of 
sincerity is most important. These cases are considered next. 
 101. Id. at 1278 (noting defendant’s position at oral argument). 
 102. Id. at 1280. 
 103. See infra notes 105–154 and accompanying text. 
 104. All of the equal protection cases discussed infra that apply the Northeastern Florida 
injury-in-fact analysis where the sincerity norm is observable are “limited-resources cases.” As 
shown below, for example, in contracting cases the pool of ultimate benefits at stake—the number 
contracts for municipal construction work that will be awarded—is limited. There are only so many 
contracts to be set aside under any given preference program. Similarly, in admissions cases, the 
pool of ultimate benefits at stake—spots for admission in a university class—are limited. 
Additionally, in the Title IX context, parties are fighting over how to spend limited resources: a 
university’s budget. 
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B. Subset of Limited-Resources Cases:  
Transparent Competitive Processes 
As set forth above, the norm of sincerity is most important when the 
benefits distributed or denied are finite in number, or in other words, 
when the ability to compete for limited resources is at issue. As will be 
shown below, the norm of sincerity is most observable in cases in which 
a transparent competitive process governs the competition. In these 
cases, the steps in the competitive process serve as explicit markers of 
preparation. When a plaintiff misses one such marker, courts require 
further evidence of intent—evidence that implicitly measures sincerity. 
As will be seen, the able-and-ready standard works best when such 
analytical markers are transparent. 
One reason that the standard works best when the relevant analytical 
markers are transparent should not be surprising. That reason is that 
when the rules of a game—any game—are transparent, any spectator 
watching that game should be able to observe whether a competitor 
“broke” the rules. Similarly, when there are clear prerequisites that must 
be met before a competitor is prepared to compete, a spectator should be 
able to observe for himself whether the competitor met those 
prerequisites. 
In a nonlegal sense, consider a competitor who says she intends to 
run a race. She comes to the track but does not line up. Further, she puts 
on track shoes, but with only moments to go before the race begins, she 
has yet to tie them. By not lining up and by not tying her shoes, she 
seems unprepared to compete, despite her stated intent. 
Applying that principle here suggests that if the process by which the 
government awards or distributes a benefit is a transparent one, then a 
judge should have the analytical tools available to her by which she 
could evaluate whether a plaintiff challenging that award was adequately 
prepared to participate in the competitive process. That is, she should 
have markers by which she could assess preparation and thereby 
determine sincerity: if those markers are met, the sincerity norm is met; 
if not, the sincerity norm requires additional evidence to prove the 
plaintiff’s subjective intent. 
For example, in an admissions case, a marker of preparation is the 
intent to apply or the actual application; in a contracting case, a marker 
of preparation can be the ability to pay a required fee, a submitted 
proposal, or a history of similar work; and in a Title IX case, a marker of 
preparation is the student’s status as an athlete. In any of these contexts, 
when a plaintiff misses an important marker, courts tend to seek 
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additional evidence of preparation as evidence of sincerity. At that level, 
the court is implicitly testing the plaintiff’s intent and sincerity. 
The following discussion shows the analytical effect of meeting, or 
missing, a relevant marker in a limited-resources discrimination case. 
The discussion is organized by type of marker as follows: (1) evidence of 
relevant background or experience (i.e., a history of playing a particular 
sport or performing a certain type of work in the past); and (2) evidence 
of minimal qualification (i.e., the ability to pay an application fee or the 
ability to play a sport that a university does not offer to students). 
1. Past behavior, experience, or background 
When a competitive process requires a competitor to take some 
action to be eligible to compete, past behavior, experience, or 
background can be relevant to the able-and-ready analysis. When a 
plaintiff fails to take a required action, suspicions arise, and, as courts 
look further for additional evidence, courts implicitly test the plaintiff’s 
sincerity. While the paradigm case of Carroll v. Nakatani105 is one 
example of this analysis, Northeastern Florida106 set the groundwork for 
the analysis. It is worth returning to a more detailed discussion of 
Northeastern Florida here to illustrate how a missed marker can trigger 
the sincerity norm. 
Recall that in Northeastern Florida, the issue for the Supreme Court 
was whether AGC, the plaintiff association of contractors, lacked 
standing because it had not shown that any of its members would have 
won the contract at stake if they had been permitted to compete for it.107 
The standing issue had been suggested in a concurring opinion108 in an 
Eleventh Circuit ruling that reversed the district court’s issuance of a 
preliminary injunction prohibiting Jacksonville from operating the 
challenged ordinance.109 On remand, the district court entered a 
permanent injunction.110 When the case again returned to the Eleventh 
Circuit, the court specifically analyzed the standing issue previously 
 105. For a discussion of Nakatani, see supra notes 37–59 and accompanying text. 
 106. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656 (1993). 
 107. Id. at 658. 
 108. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 896 
F.2d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 1990) (Tjoflat, J., concurring), rev’d, 508 U.S. 656. 
 109. Id. at 1286. 
 110. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 951 
F.2d 1217, 1218 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting procedural history). 
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raised by Judge Tjoflat111 and vacated the district court’s permanent 
injunction.112
In that opinion, the Eleventh Circuit found that AGC lacked standing 
because it had not averred that any one of its members would have “bid 
successfully” on any contract if the ordinance had not been in place.113 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh’s Circuit’s reasoning 
and conclusion and instead found that the plaintiff had adequately 
averred the required personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.114 
The Supreme Court credited AGC’s pleading that “many of its members 
‘regularly bid on and perform construction work for the City of 
Jacksonville’” and “that they ‘would have . . . bid on . . . designated set 
aside contracts but for the restrictions imposed’ by the ordinance.”115 As 
set forth above, the Court found that this pleading demonstrated that 
AGC was able and ready to compete, and that AGC was not required to 
establish that it would have successfully bid if permitted to compete.116 
This opinion set in motion the pattern of looking to whether a plaintiff 
has “met” the relevant analytical markers to shed light on whether the 
plaintiff was able and ready to compete. 
A counterexample occurs when the plaintiff meets all relevant intent 
markers of the particular competitive process at issue, and, accordingly, 
the court finds that the plaintiff was able and ready to compete. In this 
situation, the norm of sincerity is met when the plaintiff meets the 
relevant markers, and the court does not need to engage in a more 
thorough examination of the record for supporting evidence. 
An example of this effect is Comer v. Cisneros,117 a consolidated 
equal protection, statutory fair housing, and civil rights class action, in 
which both individual and group plaintiffs challenged as racially 
discriminatory the manner in which three federal public housing 
programs were being administered locally in and around the city of 
Buffalo.118 There were two distinct groups of plaintiffs in the case, the 
 111. Id. at 1218–19. 
 112. Id. at 1220. 
 113. Id. at 1219 (finding that AGC failed to state injury in fact as it did not demonstrate that, 
but for the ordinance, “any AGC member would have bid successfully” for any contract). 
 114. Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 
U.S. 656 (1993), 508 U.S. at 656. 
 115. Id. at 659 (quoting AGC’s complaint, ¶¶ 9, 46). 
 116. Id. at 666, 668–69; see also supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 117. 37 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 118. Id. at 784–86 (noting procedural history of cases). 
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“RAC plaintiffs” and the “Belmont plaintiffs.”119 The defense 
challenged both groups’ standing on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds.120
The plaintiffs alleged that while the programs offered opportunities 
for suburban housing vouchers, city administrators routinely and 
intentionally did not inform black applicants of this option,121 thereby 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them on the basis of 
race the opportunity to benefit from the program.122 In this case, set 
procedures determined how a resident applied for a voucher.123 
Additionally, set criteria determined the priority of applicants to receive 
vouchers.124 The district court found that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing,125 but upon appellate review, the Second Circuit reversed.126
Specifically, the court pointed to testimony offered by the lead RAC 
plaintiff that (1) she wished to move outside of city public housing127 
and that (2) she had applied for public housing but had not been 
informed of the possibility of using a voucher to move outside the 
city.128 The court also pointed to evidence offered by the lead Belmont 
plaintiff that she had also filed applications for the vouchers.129 With 
respect to both sets of lead plaintiffs, past application history “marked” 
their preparation to compete. Because these plaintiffs met these relevant 
markers, the court implicitly found that the plaintiffs sincerely intended 
 119. RAC is the nonprofit organization that, by contract with the City of Buffalo, operates its 
Section 8 housing program. Id. at 783. Belmont is the nonprofit organization that, by contract with 
the City of Amherst, operates its suburban Section 8 program. Id. 
 120. Id. at 786 (noting that the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on 
standing). Only the analysis of standing requirements to press the equal protection claim is 
considered here. 
 121. Id. at 790–91. 
 122. Id. at 785–86. 
 123. See id. at 781–83 (discussing the statutory and regulatory background of a Section 8 
housing program). 
 124. Id. at 781 (noting that applicants were prioritized by family situation, including the 
condition of their housing, the fact of involuntary displacement, and the percentage of family income 
paid to rent). 
 125. Id. at 779. 
 126. Id. at 795 (reversing the district court’s opinion on standing). 
 127. Id. at 791. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 794–95 (reviewing evidence of standing produced by plaintiff Jessie Comer, who 
“believed that an applicant had to live outside the city limits to obtain a Belmont subsidy. When she 
learned otherwise, she applied for a Belmont subsidy. . . . At this time, Comer is homeless, although 
living with a relative, and waiting for affordable housing to become available.”). 
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to use the benefits of the voucher programs; there was no reason to 
suspect otherwise or to look for further evidence of intent. 
Similarly, to show injury in fact under Northeastern Florida in the 
context of challenges to preferential treatment on the basis of race or 
ethnicity in higher education admissions, an applicant (or prospective 
applicant) need not demonstrate conclusively that she would have been 
admitted but for the discriminatory admissions preference.130 Instead, 
she must demonstrate only that she was able and ready to compete for 
admission but that she was prevented from competing equally due to an 
allegedly discriminatory preference.131 Courts looking at injury in fact in 
admissions cases therefore have generally required a plaintiff to make 
that demonstration by either applying to the school or credibly pleading 
that she intended or intends to apply. For example, in Wooden v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit found that a 
student who could not show evidence of his averred intent to transfer to 
the defendant institution lacked standing to seek prospective relief 
against that school.132 As a counterexample, the majority of the Court in 
Gratz v. Bollinger did not question the sincerity of plaintiff Patrick 
Hamacher’s professed intent to, one day, file for admission as a transfer 
student to the University of Michigan.133 Of course, Justice Stevens, in 
dissent, did implicitly question Mr. Hamacher’s sincerity.134
The Wooden and Gratz examples illustrate what the reader has 
undoubtedly suspected by now: the concept of sincerity certainly has its 
limits. Not all “missed markers” will strike all judges in the same way; 
not every missed marker of preparation will seem equally suspicious 
among all judges. That sincerity has its limits, however, does not 
disprove that the concept is, under the able-and-ready test for injury in 
fact, relevant. 
 130. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 262 (2003) (applying Northeastern Florida to 
university admissions, concluding an applicant need not show she would have ultimately been 
admitted but for the challenged barrier; rather, she was “ready and able” to compete). 
 131. See id. 
 132. 247 F.3d 1262, 1284–85 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is no evidence that [plaintiff] intends 
to re-apply for admission to [defendant institution] under any version of the [challenged] admissions 
policy.”). 
 133. 539 U.S. at 262 (finding that Plaintiff Hamacher averred in the complaint in the case that 
he “intended” to apply as a transfer student, which “demonstrated that he was ‘able and ready’ to 
apply as a transfer student should the University cease to use race in undergraduate admissions”). 
 134. See id. at 282–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hamacher’s alleged intent to 
reapply to the University was merely “hypothetical” and did not demonstrate the required personal 
stake in the resolution of the dispute over the ongoing freshman admissions policies). 
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2. Minimal qualification 
Another marker of preparation is evidence of objective minimal 
qualification to compete. Cases in both the contracting and Title IX 
contexts offer examples. 
a. The contracting context. In the contracting context, the benefits at 
stake are the contracts themselves, and the markers of preparation are 
derived from the procedures, which are usually statutory, by which 
government awards those contracts. One type of marker evidence in this 
context is whether the contractor is minimally qualified to compete for 
the contract. “Minimally qualified to compete” does not mean whether 
the contractor would have ultimately won the contract; instead it refers 
only to whether the contractor could have competed in the first place. 
Relevant markers therefore could include whether the contractor filed the 
required application or whether the contractor otherwise demonstrated an 
ability to begin the bidding process. If a relevant objective marker is 
missed, the pattern is that courts in this context can become suspicious 
that the plaintiff intended to compete for, or to ultimately use, the 
benefits at stake. Thus, if a missed objective marker causes the court to 
doubt the plaintiff’s subjective intent, the court can then require further 
evidence of the plaintiff’s sincerity. 
For example, in Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa 
Indians v. Michigan Gaming Control Board,135 the defendant challenged 
the plaintiff’s standing in part because the plaintiff had not actually 
applied for the contract.136 The defense had argued that this failure 
showed a lack of injury in fact, and the district court agreed, finding no 
evidence that met its requirements of “ready and able.”137 However, the 
Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff did have standing.138
The evidence that satisfied the Sixth Circuit included allegations in 
the amended complaint setting forth the plaintiff’s history as a developer 
and an affidavit stating that the plaintiff was aware of and able to comply 
with all of the city’s requirements, including payment of fees.139 
Explicitly, the Sixth Circuit found that the able-and-ready standard did 
 135. 172 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 136. Id. at 403 (noting that the district court found plaintiff lacked standing for equal 
protection claim). 
 137. Id. at 403–04. 
 138. Id. at 404 ( “Lac Vieux argues that the district court erred in determining that it was not 
ready and able misapplied [Northeastern Florida], and ignored crucial evidence. We agree.”). 
 139. Id. at 404–05 (reviewing and crediting allegations in amended complaint and in 
affidavit). 
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not require the plaintiff to have submitted a viable proposal; rather, the 
court found that the evidence offered by the plaintiff—suggesting a track 
record as a developer and the ability to meet the City’s requirements—
showed that the plaintiff was “able and ready.”140
Thus, although the plaintiff “missed” an objective marker of 
preparation by failing to actually apply for the contract at stake, which 
failure raised the district court’s suspicions, the appellate court was 
satisfied that the plaintiff showed minimal qualification to compete. 
Explicitly, the plaintiff’s qualification evidence demonstrated that the 
plaintiff was able and ready to compete; implicitly, the evidence 
confirmed that the plaintiff sincerely intended to compete for the 
contract. 
b. The Title IX context. In the Title IX context, the benefits at stake 
are limited university resources for athletic programs. Generally, Title IX 
challenges can be based on either of two theories: (1) “ineffective 
accommodation,” which is a specific complaint as to a university’s 
treatment of a single women’s team or sport; or (2) “unequal treatment,” 
which is a broader complaint that the university generally treated female 
athletes unequally relative to male athletes.141 The relevant marker of 
standing in both types of claims is the plaintiff’s status as an athlete. 
In Pederson v. Louisiana State University, the plaintiffs brought both 
types of claims.142 On the ineffective accommodation claim, the 
“Pedersen plaintiffs” charged that the university unlawfully failed to 
accommodate their request for a varsity women’s soccer team.143 
Notably, these plaintiffs were all club soccer athletes.144 This fact was 
insufficient to the district court because the district court apparently 
required the plaintiffs to claim “being denied the opportunity to compete 
on a specific varsity team,” which they did not do.145
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that the students’ status as club 
soccer players was determinative of the plaintiffs’ ability to show injury 
in fact with respect to the claim that the university discriminated against 
 140. Id. at 406. 
 141. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 865 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting frequent 
distinction of types of claims brought under Title IX and noting that the distinction derives from 
federal regulations implementing Title IX). 
 142. Id. at 858. 
 143. Id. at 870. 
 144. Id. at 871. 
 145. Id. (noting error in the district court’s legal analysis). 
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them by failing to field a varsity women’s soccer team.146 The Fifth 
Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs’ status as club soccer players meant 
that they stood able and ready to compete for a varsity women’s soccer 
team—the ultimate benefit at stake in the case.147 Implicitly, the status 
of “club soccer athletes” served as a relevant marker of preparation, as 
that status suggested that the students would in fact try out and could 
compete for a varsity soccer team if one were fielded. In other words, the 
Fifth Circuit found this status important because it confirmed the 
plaintiffs’ preparation to compete. Implicitly, however, the status was 
important because it showed the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ claimed 
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. That is to say, these 
women sincerely intended to play varsity soccer if given the chance. As 
such, the case was not abstract or political to them; rather, it was 
personal. Thus, in this case, the able-and-ready analysis helped the court 
to explicitly evaluate the plaintiffs’ preparation, and the norm of sincerity 
helped the court to implicitly evaluate the plaintiffs’ personal stake in the 
case. 
Consider how the case might have come out if the plaintiffs had been 
club swimmers who claimed that the university failed to accommodate 
their request for a women’s varsity soccer team. If the plaintiffs had been 
swimmers, even varsity swimmers, the court might have questioned their 
personal stake in the case: do they really want to play varsity soccer, or is 
the case about equalizing opportunities in higher education generally? 
The court could have inferred that the litigation was intended not 
primarily to resolve a concrete dispute between adversaries but to 
advance a social or political cause (i.e., increase funding for all women’s 
sports because it is the right thing to do or offer more sports to women 
because it is the right thing to do). In Pederson, by contrast, the court 
apparently drew the opposite inference, at least as to the ineffective 
accommodation claim: the plaintiffs’ status as club soccer players 
objectively demonstrated the sincerity of their stated intent to play 
varsity soccer if a varsity team were fielded. 
In fact, the court in Pederson did suspect an ideological stake in the 
outcome of the litigation with respect to the plaintiffs’ second claim—the 
broad equal treatment claim. In that claim, the plaintiffs “challenge[d] 
LSU’s entire varsity athletic program as it then existed, including the 
 146. Id. (analyzing Northeastern Florida and holding that “to establish standing under a Title 
IX effective accommodation claim, a party need only demonstrate that she is ‘able and ready’ to 
compete for a position on the unfielded team”). 
 147. Id. 
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allocation of scholarships and other benefits to varsity athletes.”148 
Because under the unequal treatment claim the plaintiffs were 
challenging the university’s treatment of all, but only, varsity athletes, 
the relevant marker was the status of being, or preparing to be, a varsity 
athlete.149
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that 
the plaintiffs, none of whom was a varsity athlete and who apparently did 
not plead that they wished to become a varsity athlete, lacked standing to 
press the unequal treatment claim.150
Notably, in a footnote, the Fifth Circuit came quite close to explicitly 
recognizing that sincerity was a factor with respect to the equal treatment 
claim: 
We do not mean to imply that an equal treatment claim can only be 
brought by an existing varsity athlete. Whether, for example, a female 
student who was deterred from competing for a spot on an existing 
varsity team because of perceived unequal treatment of female varsity 
athletes would have standing to challenge the existing varsity program 
is a question we leave for another day.151
Textually, the point here is fairly basic: without first being varsity 
athletes or wanting to be varsity athletes, the plaintiffs did not have the 
required personal stake in the case because any change in treatment of 
varsity athletes resulting from the outcome of the case would not 
“impact” these women.152 To cure this defect, the court in the footnote 
noted that this specific issue would be left for “another day.”153 The text 
of the note states, however, that what was not before the court in this 
particular case was the allegation that the plaintiffs were “deterred from 
competing for a spot on an existing varsity team because of perceived 
unequal treatment.”154 In other words, the court suggested that it might 
have resolved the standing question differently if the plaintiffs had 
simply but explicitly averred that they were “deterred from competing 
 148. Id. at 872 (emphasis added). 
 149. This distinction is important because it shows the implicit norm of sincerity at work. See 
infra notes 172–175 and accompanying text. 
 150. Pederson, 213 F.3d at 872. 
 151. Id. at 872 n.13. 
 152. Id. at 872 & n.14 (quoting the District Court Memorandum Ruling). 
 153. Id. at 872 n.13. 
 154. Id.  
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for a spot on an existing varsity team because of perceived unequal 
treatment.”155  
This suggestion should sound odd—such a simple pleading trick 
cannot possibly account for the difference between finding a personal 
stake and not finding a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. 
Rather, surely the court would, and should, require that a plaintiff 
making this averment actually mean it. The unacceptability of an 
insincere averment of intent is obvious. That unacceptability 
demonstrates the implicit but nonetheless crucial role that is played here 
by the norm of sincerity. The point is this: implicit in the footnote’s 
analysis is the assumption that if and only if such a plaintiff were sincere 
about her stated intent to compete might she be able to demonstrate 
personal stake required for injury in fact in the equal treatment claim. 
Accordingly, this footnote shows that in this class of cases, courts can 
find sincerity to be a highly important factor in the injury-in-fact 
analysis. Similarly, this section showed that judging sincerity is 
something that courts in fact do, whether or not they explicitly recognize 
that judgment for what it is. The next section will show that the sincerity 
judgment is an important one and, given the rapid developments 
underway in antidiscrimination law, is poised to become even more 
important. 
IV. RELEVANCE: WHY DOES THE NORM OF SINCERITY MATTER? 
I noted early on that a likely coming focus of equal protection 
litigation is challenges to nonadmission preference programs in higher 
education.156 Indeed, as Justice Scalia predicted these claims in his 
dissenting opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger,157 litigation against the 
“tempting targets” is all but imminent. 
As a result, administrators at colleges and universities across the 
country are now finding themselves threatened with either private 
litigation or a federal investigation158 if their school does not 
immediately “open” or eliminate any and all such programs on its 
campus (which programs can be in the tens, if not hundreds, at any small 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 157. 539 U.S. 306, 349 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 158. See Press Release, Center for Equal Opportunity, CEO Uncovers More Discrimination at 
Virginia Tech: Request from Office for Civil Rights Results in Identification of Dozens More 
Programs (June 11, 2003), available at http://www.ceousa.org/ 
updates.html. 
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university). For example, consider the administrators at Virginia Tech. In 
April 2003, they received notice of a complaint that was filed with the 
Office of Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education (OCR) by the 
Center for Equal Opportunity (CEO).159 In a June 2003 memo to OCR, 
CEO summarized the allegations in the complaint and identified over 
sixty preference programs at Virginia Tech that CEO summarily claimed 
constituted unlawful discrimination.160 Some of the programs identified 
in that memo included: minority-only or minority-preferred leadership 
workshops, scholarships, fellowships, mentoring programs, summer 
research internships, and recruiting and outreach programs.161 In 
addition to the complaint pending at OCR regarding Virginia Tech, 
multiple complaints and investigations are pending involving other 
schools.162
Although administrators at Virginia Tech are defending against this 
complaint, administrators at many other schools have decided to make 
changes to these programs upon only a threat of a similar complaint.163 
For example, since 2003, at least seventy schools have voluntarily 
opened minority-based programs to nonminority students.164 Some 
college administrators are concerned about these programs on a number 
of levels. First, these programs are one way that universities meet their 
minority students’ needs to fit in on campus.165 Some administrators find 
 159. See Memorandum from CEO to OCR (June 10, 2003), available at 
http://www.ceousa.org/pdfs/VATechOCRMemo.pdf (discussing OCR’s complaint against Virginia 
Tech). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Schmidt, supra note 8, at A17 (noting that at that time, “[o]nly two colleges, 
Pepperdine University and Washington University in St. Louis, have refused to alter scholarship 
programs that have been challenged by [CEO and the American Civil Rights Institute (“ACRI”)] and 
brought to the attention of the Office for Civil Rights”). 
 163. See id. (interviewing general counsel of Carnegie Mellon University who “responded 
defiantly early last year when its academic summer camp for minority students was challenged by” 
CEO and ACRI and who originally “planned . . . to wait for the federal courts to offer guidance,” but 
following the Michigan decisions, decided to open its campus “summer camp” and full scholarship 
program to any student who demonstrated an ability to contribute to diversity on campus, and ended 
a policy of preferring certain minority students when awarding need-based aid). 
 164. Id.; see also Editorial, Color-Blind Progress, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2004, at A16. 
 165. See, e.g., Sarah Brummett, Law Students Petition for a Minority Lounge, WASH. SQUARE 
NEWS, February 17, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.nyunews.com/vnews/ 
display.v/ART/2006/02/17/43f57a3433506?in_archive=1 (reporting that, in support of a petition 
asking for a “minority law lounge” at the school, minority students anonymously stated feeling 
“isolated and estranged from the classroom environment” and stated that the “voices” of the “few 
people of color” were “lost in the melee”); see also Katherine S. Mangan, Does Affirmative Action 
Hurt Black Law Students?, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 12, 2004, at A35 (interviewing a minority 
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that meeting this need is important to retain and ultimately graduate all 
students.166 However, other administrators are concerned that identity-
conscious programs, including admissions, could be divisive among 
students on campus167 and/or that they are unlawful.168
The idea behind these challenges (and the threat of such challenges) 
seems to be that while the Supreme Court held in Grutter that student 
body diversity is a compelling government interest that may justify the 
use of race in certain circumstances in admissions,169 the use of race in 
any other context is uncertain and therefore suspect. While an analysis of 
the merits of this position is outside the scope of this Article, it seems 
fair to say that neither Grutter, nor its companion decision,170 nor any 
decision since then has conclusively determined the fate of such 
programs on the merits. While it is clear that, to promote educational 
diversity, universities may consider race as one of many factors in an 
admissions program, it is not at all clear to what extent universities may 
consider race in programs outside of admissions to promote that same 
goal. 
For three reasons, the able-and-ready standard of determining injury 
in fact in equal protection cases is going to raise novel, important, and 
difficult questions for plaintiffs and courts in these cases. First, the 
benefits of these programs are distributed from scarce resources, which 
lawyer who graduated in 2003 from Harvard Law School, who “sa[id that] racial preferences are not 
the issue. ‘The problem is not so much the entry; it’s what happens while you’re there . . . .’ As a 
minority law student, ‘you’re more likely to feel isolated and marginalized, and feel like ‘nobody 
gets my experience.’”). 
 166. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 8, at A17 (interviewing president of Haverford College 
regarding the school’s summer minority preorientation program, who noted that “the students who 
participate tend to fare better in college than those who don’t”). 
 167. See, e.g., Peter B. Schmidt, A New Route to Racial Diversity, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Jan. 28, 2005, at A22 (interviewing Robert M. Gates, President of Texas A&M, and noting that “one 
of [Gates’s] goals in retaining race-blind admissions was ensuring ‘that every student here knew that 
every other student was here on the same basis’”). 
 168. See Schmidt, supra note 4, at A26 (“Colleges throughout the nation interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s Michigan rulings as leaving their race-exclusive programs vulnerable to legal 
challenge. They responded by opening the programs to other groups, like students who were 
economically disadvantaged or had demonstrated a commitment to promoting diversity.”); see also 
Schmidt, supra note 8, at A17 (“Colleges throughout the nation are quietly opening a wide range of 
minority programs to students of any race, mainly to avoid being accused of discrimination.”). 
 169. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (“[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell’s 
view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in 
university admissions.”). 
 170. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking down racial preference in 
undergraduate admissions program as insufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state 
interest: educational diversity). 
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means that sincerity should be an important factor in the injury-in-fact 
analysis.171 Second, only in some of these programs will there be a 
transparent competitive process by which the university distributes the 
benefits (and so by which intent and sincerity can be measured). Third, 
because these cases will be somewhat inherently political, courts may, as 
in Nakatani, be presented with some plaintiffs who present at least some 
ideological, as opposed to a legal, stake in the case. For these reasons, 
the sincerity norm should be an important factor in this context. 
Because it is only a matter of time before these cases reach the 
docket of a federal courthouse, and because these cases are likely to 
contribute important principles to the developing law of 
antidiscrimination, it is worth considering a bit in depth how the standing 
analysis in one such case might unfold. Further, it is worth considering in 
depth what role we might expect the norm of sincerity to play in this 
context. 
To do that, first consider a hypothetical complaint that raises the 
issue of whether a state-supported university’s racial or ethnic preference 
programs in two different nonadmissions contexts violate two different 
students’ federal constitutional equal-protection rights. Following the 
conclusion of the resolution of the hypothetical complaint, this Article 
proposes a model for reconceptualizing the norm of sincerity in this class 
of cases. 
A. A Hypothetical Complaint: Student v. University 
Imagine that you are a district court judge and a new equal protection 
case has just been assigned to you. It is May. There are two plaintiffs in 
the case. Plaintiff A is an incoming freshman; she has been accepted for 
freshman admission at defendant State University and has committed to 
attending the school in the fall. Plaintiff B has just completed his 
freshman year at State U; he is now a rising sophomore. 
Plaintiff A is a white woman; Plaintiff B is white man. Both 
plaintiffs claim that their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title VI172 have been violated because the university operates multiple 
 171. See supra text accompanying notes 117–155. 
 172. Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d to d-6 (2000). While Title VI 
regulations “prohibit practices with racially discriminatory effect,” there is no private right of action 
to enforce them. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 541 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. 
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001)). Further, if a tempting-targets plaintiff styled his claim as an action 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1981, such a claim would be “governed by the substantive standards applicable to 
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programs on campus in which they would like to participate but cannot 
participate because the programs are reserved for minorities only.173  
The complaint challenges two programs in particular: first, a two-day 
minority-only “pre-orientation” session held just before the school’s 
general freshman orientation session; and second, the “multicultural 
leadership development initiative” (MuLDI). Plaintiff A avers she has 
not been invited to the pre-orientation session and anticipates being 
excluded from MuLDI. Plaintiff A seeks both compensatory damages 
and prospective relief as to all programs.174 Plaintiff B complains that he 
was not invited to participate in the pre-orientation session or MuLDI 
last year and is still being excluded from MuLDI as it is open to minority 
students only, regardless of class year. Plaintiff B seeks damages with 
respect to the orientation programming and both damages and 
prospective relief as to MuLDI. 
Specifically, the complaint avers that the pre-orientation sessions 
offer academic programming, including a two-hour session entitled 
“Study Skills for Success,” and a two-hour “Introduction to the Library” 
tour. The complaint declares that these programs advantage participants 
by providing them with additional resources needed to succeed in higher 
education that are not available to students who have been excluded on 
the basis of race or ethnicity. Plaintiffs claim this program is a barrier to 
their ability to properly transition from high school to college academics. 
Plaintiffs also indicate that MuLDI is a leadership skills program in 
which minority students of all class years are invited to participate in a 
series of monthly leadership development workshops throughout the 
academic year. The complaint states that the plaintiffs have been 
disadvantaged by not being able to participate in MuLDI because they do 
not have the same access to the college’s resources for building 
leadership skills as do the invited students, who are all minorities. 
The complaint avers generally that Plaintiff A would like to 
participate in this year’s pre-orientation academic programming because 
she does not want any of her classmates to get a “leg up” on her, and 
both claim jointly that they would like the chance to participate in 
MuLDI because “it is a good opportunity.” The complaint states that 
Plaintiff A is able and ready to come to campus early for the pre-
race-based challenges brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Doe v. 
Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416 F.3d 1025, 1038–39 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 173. Assume that the defendant university defines “minorities” as any person who identifies 
herself as a member of a racial or ethnic group that is non-caucasian. 
 174. For the sake of argument, assume there is no ripeness problem with these claims. 
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orientation session and that both plaintiffs are able and ready to 
participate in MuLDI if invited. Finally, the complaint avers generally in 
support of the allegations that because the Constitution is “color-blind” 
and because the school receives some federal funding, the school is 
required to permit all students to participate in any program operated by 
the institution without discriminating on the basis of race or national 
origin. 
You are not surprised to see this complaint, though after some initial 
research, you confirm that other than the Michigan decisions,175 there 
are no decided cases that you can consult for guidance on these specific 
issues. In this hypothetical complaint has either plaintiff stated injury in 
fact? 
1. Pre-orientation session 
FACTS: From limited discovery you granted on standing, you now 
know that there is a general student orientation session that immediately 
followed the pre-orientation program about which the plaintiff 
complains. At that general orientation session, the plaintiffs, along with 
every other student, were offered the same or similar opportunities for 
social introduction and academic preparation as were offered to the 
minorities who were invited to and attended the pre-orientation session. 
Specifically, the record shows that at the general orientation, all students 
are invited to a similar but not identical two hour session on academic 
preparation/study skills, and all students are offered the same two-hour 
library tour. 
PLAINTIFF A: In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff A admitted that 
she was interested generally in attending academic preparation sessions 
but that she had no particular interest in attending the same library tour 
twice, and, if given the opportunity, would not choose to attend the same 
session on study skills twice. 
RESULT A: Plaintiff A fails to meet the norm of sincerity with 
respect to the academic programming offered at the pre-orientation 
session. Plaintiff A has missed a relevant marker of preparation here: she 
has admitted that even if given the chance, she would not attend the 
study skills session twice.176 From this you conclude that Plaintiff A has 
shown no concrete stake in the litigation over these two programs. She is 
 175. The “Michigan decisions” are, of course, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 176. See supra notes 106–130 and accompanying text. 
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interested in improving her study skills, but she does not believe that 
these programs will help her do that. The court should not announce a 
new constitutional rule on whether colleges can use race to distribute 
benefits such as upon Plaintiff A’s claim. The courts should wait for a 
plaintiff who has a stake in the outcome of the litigation. 
PLAINTIFF B: In contrast to Plaintiff A, Plaintiff B maintains that if 
given the opportunity, he would have attended both of the academic 
preparation sessions offered at the pre-orientation, even though 
substantially similar programs were offered to all students at the school’s 
general freshman orientation the following week. Plaintiff B testified that 
he was not confident in his academic skills as an entering freshman and 
that he would have benefited from the extra attention earlier on. Plaintiff 
B’s admissions file shows that his SAT scores were slightly below the 
average for admitted students in his class. 
RESULT B: Plaintiff B meets the norm of sincerity as to the pre-
orientation academic programming. Plaintiff B has met the relevant 
markers here: he was interested in each of the two specific sessions 
offered at the summer orientation, and he testified that he would have 
attended both. As further evidence, he offered his SAT scores, which, 
while not terrible, were not outstanding. It is reasonable to conclude that 
a person in his circumstances is sincere when he states that he would 
have attended and used the benefits of the study skills session and the 
library tour. The court should find that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated 
injury in fact to pursue this claim for damages. 
2. MuLDI 
FACTS: Discovery shows that, shortly after classes begin in the fall 
of each year, State University offers all students the chance to attend a 
full day diversity awareness workshop. This workshop teaches leadership 
skills similar to those taught in the MuLDI program, and it addresses 
other issues related to diversity on campus. This workshop lasts only one 
day; it is not continued throughout the year as is the MuLDI program. 
The MuLDI program is the only program on campus that focuses on 
discussing, sharing, and promoting strategies for minorities to excel in 
leadership roles on a predominately white campus. 
PLAINTIFF A: In her deposition testimony, Plaintiff A maintains 
that she wants to participate in MuLDI but has admitted that she had not 
planned on attending the workshop in September that is open to her. 
Further, she has been unable to articulate a reason why MuLDI causes 
her injury, other than she does not want to miss out on opportunities 
2CODY.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:45:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
108 
 
provided to other students. She maintains, however, that the school is not 
permitted to exclude her from any opportunity on the basis of race or 
ethnicity. 
RESULT A: Though she expresses a facial interest in the MuLDI 
programming, Plaintiff A has not offered any evidence that shows she is 
prepared to participate in a key aspect of that program, which is the 
program’s focus on increasing the diversity on campus through 
increasing the leadership roles of students of color. When asked for 
evidence to support her stated intent to participate, she could not 
articulate how she was prepared to participate in that discussion or why 
that showed a personal stake in the resolution of the MuLDI-based claim. 
Like the plaintiff in Carroll v. Nakatani, if Plaintiff A is not prepared to 
“participate equally” in those discussions, then she is not denied equal 
treatment by being excluded from them.177 Like the plaintiff in 
Nakatani, she has failed to offer any “bona fides” that she intended to use 
the benefits if she were to “win” them.178 Similarly, like Todd Hembree, 
who challenged the validity of a Cherokee same-sex marriage, Plaintiff 
A’s ideological objection to MuLDI is not the equivalent of a legal 
interest in the outcome of a dispute over the program.179 She has not 
stated an injury in fact with respect to the MuLDI program. If a court is 
going to adjudicate the issues raised by the MuLDI complaint, it should 
wait for a plaintiff who shows a personal stake in the outcome of the 
litigation.180
PLAINTIFF B: Plaintiff B also maintains that he has been injured by 
not being invited to MuLDI in his freshman year and wants to participate 
in the full MuLDI program as a sophomore. However, Plaintiff B 
admitted in his deposition testimony that he did not attend the one day 
diversity workshop that the school held in the fall of his freshman year, 
but he claims that he does intend to attend this year’s workshop. Plaintiff 
B further testified that while he is a member of the majority population 
on campus, he feels he has experiences that would contribute to the 
discussion of diversity and leadership on campus. In support, he points to 
a record of volunteer work with small nonprofit agencies in an urban 
community neighborhood, including three years of service as a literacy 
tutor to at-risk junior high school students. 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 178. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 57–63. 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 34–54. 
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RESULT B: Plaintiff B meets the norm of sincerity. Whether 
Plaintiff B states injury in fact with respect to the MuLDI claim is more 
difficult, however, than the same question as to the academic 
programming. Plaintiff B avers that he wants to participate in MuLDI, 
but he has missed a relevant marker: in the past he failed to attend a 
similar program that was open to him.181 He says he did not know about 
it at the time, which his lawyer has not been able to confirm. You are 
suspicious, so you look for other evidence of sincerity. You find it: 
Plaintiff B has a record of past relevant behavior, which is three years of 
community service tutoring at-risk youth, and the intent to attend this 
year’s workshop. This evidence confirms that Plaintiff B is sincerely 
interested in the MuLDI program. 
Plaintiff B’s sincerity is akin to that demonstrated by the club soccer 
players in the Pedersen Title IX case: by offering evidence of relevant 
background, experience, or “minimal qualification” as to diversity and 
leadership, Plaintiff B has shown a sincere interest in participating in 
those discussions.182 You consider this sincerity as a factor in your 
determination of whether Plaintiff B was able and ready to participate in 
MuLDI. 
B. A Proposed Model for Cases Without Markers 
The hypothetical complaint illustrates the role that sincerity can play 
in this context. A problem can arise when there is no transparent 
competitive process that governs the distribution of benefits because then 
it is more difficult to “judge” sincerity. And not all preferences bring a 
transparent competitive process with them. To ensure that the doctrinal 
and normative principles of the able-and-ready test are consistently 
applied—even when the challenged programs lack transparent 
competitive processes by which preparation can be most easily judged—
I offer the following models. 
One model for assessing preparation in the absence of obvious 
markers is to relax the standard back to the least common denominator of 
markers. In the nonadmission higher education context, the least 
common denominator could likely mean a simple statement that the 
plaintiff is able and ready or “wants and intends” to come to campus and 
participate in the challenged programming. If this relaxed model were 
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 106–135 (discussing past behavior as a relevant 
marker). 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 149–159. 
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the standard, almost anyone (subject to sanctions for misrepresentations 
in a pleading) could meet it. But such a permissive standard of injury in 
fact would mean that virtually anyone would have standing.183 In effect, 
Article III requirements would be waived; only prudential standing 
concerns might set bounds on the universe of potential plaintiffs here.184
However, courts applying the able-and-ready standard in limited-
resources cases do not adopt such a permissive view of injury in fact.185 
Rather, there is a pattern showing that, as part of the able-and-ready 
analysis to determine injury in fact, courts apply the norm of sincerity to 
test whether a plaintiff sincerely intended to use the benefits at stake.186 
As noted supra, the standard, and its implicit norm, serve important 
doctrinal and normative functions—functions that will be equally 
important in the tempting-targets context.187
Another model for assessing preparation which is more loyal to the 
principles underlying the able-and-ready standard is to require an 
affirmative statement by the plaintiff of her intent to use the particular 
benefits of each challenged program. By requiring an affirmative 
statement of intent, the norm of sincerity becomes a rule. By calling it a 
rule, sincerity becomes an explicit factor in the injury-in-fact analysis in 
these cases. Making sincerity an explicit factor, or rule, ensures that the 
principles of the able-and-ready standard are not lost in what will surely 
be complicated cases in this highly important developing area of law. 
If sincerity were the rule, a tempting-targets plaintiff would have to 
include, as part of her averment of being able and ready, some other fact 
showing a sincere intent to actually use the benefits at stake. For 
example, if a plaintiff complained that she was excluded from a minority 
student union, under a rule of sincerity, the required pleading of injury in 
fact would include: (1) that the plaintiff was able and ready to participate 
in that group, and (2) why or how she would benefit from participating in 
the group. Further, under a rule of sincerity, the required pleading of 
 183. Recall in these cases that causation and redressability flow from injury in fact. See supra 
text accompanying notes 29–30. 
 184. Some might argue that such a permissive standard would be, normatively, a good result. 
See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup 
Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63, 83–86 (2002) (comparing broad and narrow conceptualizations of stating 
injury to third-parties seeking to enforce provisions of Title VII prohibits against workplace 
discrimination and noting that “standing cases are shaped by a tension between lowering the 
standing threshold and tying the injury to the discriminatory harms made actionable by Congress”). 
 185. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra Part III. 
 187. See supra Part III.B.2. 
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injury in fact due to exclusion from a minority-only academic session 
would include: (1) that the plaintiff was able and ready to attend the 
session, and (2) how the plaintiff intended to use the benefits of that 
session. Finally, under a rule of sincerity, the required pleading of injury 
in fact due to exclusion from a leadership skills program would include: 
(1) that the plaintiff was able and ready to attend the session, and (2) why 
or how she would benefit from it. 
The point is that there are questions—similar to questions that have 
been raised in the able-and-ready analysis in decided cases—that could 
shed light on whether a plaintiff is in fact able and ready to benefit from 
these programs. Similar determinations are already being made, though 
implicitly, in relevant cases. By making the questions explicit, courts can 
better ensure that plaintiffs have the constitutionally required personal 
stake in the litigation. As this Article has shown, this is an adjustment 
that should be made soon—the lawyers who may bring the cases that will 
decide the next set of important constitutional principles regarding 
diversity and discrimination are probably waiting on the courthouse 
steps. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In sum, because antidiscrimination law is developing rapidly—for 
example, in the higher education context—the time has come to take 
another look at why courts find that some plaintiffs have been injured in 
fact by the alleged discrimination, and some have not. As shown in Part 
I, it is not enough for a limited-resources discrimination plaintiff to aver 
that discrimination prevented her from winning a government benefit. 
Rather, a plaintiff in a limited-resources discrimination case must be able 
to show that, at the time she was discriminated against, she stood able 
and ready to compete for the benefit at stake. As shown in Part II, the 
able-and-ready test has an inherent norm, the norm of sincerity, which 
some courts have implicitly drawn on to help evaluate a plaintiff’s stated 
injury in fact. Part III demonstrated how courts judge sincerity: what 
triggers the norm and how it operates to root out falsity and identify a 
plaintiff’s personal stake in the litigation. 
 Part IV showed that the norm is likely to be particularly relevant and 
necessary in an upcoming area of equal protection litigation—an area 
vulnerable to being co-opted to press a political agenda. That litigation 
has been presaged by Justice Scalia, who told us to expect students to file 
lawsuits alleging discrimination in university affirmative action 
preferences outside of the admissions context. One challenge for a court 
2CODY.FIN.DOC 5/12/2006 12:45:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
112 
hearing this type of claim will be to ensure that the plaintiff pressing the 
claim brings a legal dispute to the courthouse, rather than (or at least in 
addition to) a political one.  
 Because the norm of sincerity helps courts ensure that a complaint 
asserts a legally cognizable injury and helps root out claims based on 
ideological or political injury, recognizing the norm of sincerity will help 
courts better serve the gatekeeping function with which they’ve been 
charged by Article III. And, while the complaint in Part IV illustrating 
the norm at work in this context was only hypothetical, as predicted by 
Justice Scalia, its real world counterpart probably is not far off.
